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1 Introduction
This paper identifies a novel source of risk that helps to explain the observed time-series patterns
in venture capital (VC) investment performance: exposure to shocks to the level of aggregate
idiosyncratic return volatility. While idiosyncratic shocks are by definition mean-zero return shocks,
the level of idiosyncratic volatility drives VC returns through the value of the real options embedded
in VC contracts. When volatility increases, these real options become more valuable, improving
VCs’ performance. This paper examines the extent to which this exposure can explain observed
patterns in VC investment performance and dynamics and identifies the primary channel driving
this empirical relationship.
Two common contractual channels of VC investments generate option-like characteristics. The
first is the liquidation preference given to investors, which entitles them to recuperate at least
their initial investment before other investors participate in proceeds from any potential firm exit.
These liquidation preferences imply a nonlinear payoff structure similar to those in equity options.
The second channel is the (real) reinvestment option embedded in the contracts that VCs write
with their portfolio companies, namely a right of first refusal for participation in future financing
rounds.1
There are a number of other reasons why idiosyncratic volatility might be especially important to
the VC sector. First, VC returns are known to be highly skewed. Metrick and Yasuda (2011), among
others, show that a very large share of the total returns in VC come from a small fraction of their
investments. Additionally, the compensation structure of VC general partners (GPs) themselves
(eg. two and twenty) encourages the construction of portfolios that have a high total return
variance, and thus a high idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, VCs traditionally invest in the types
of firms (small, high-tech) whose idiosyncratic volatility is high and loads heavily on aggregate
changes in idiosyncratic volatility. While each of these characteristics of VC investments suggest
that idiosyncratic volatility may be particularly large, none of them suggest that changes in the
level of idiosyncratic volatility should drive returns.
1Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) demonstrate that these contractual features emerge from the contracting
environment with learning and moral hazard.
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I investigate the empirical relation between VC investments and innovations in aggregate id-
iosyncratic volatility at three levels of aggregation. First, at the asset class level, I measure the
exposure of VC benchmark portfolios to changes is aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. Second, I use
detailed data on investor cash flows to investigate the time heterogeneous exposure of individual
VC funds to innovations in asset volatility during those funds’ lives. The third level of aggregation
is at the level of individual investments by VCs into their portfolio companies, where I investigate
the extent to which idiosyncratic volatility is related to the process by which VCs invest.
Rather than directly constructing a measure of VC portfolio company idiosyncratic volatility,
I use a measure of the idiosyncratic volatility of publicly traded equities from Herskovic, Kelly,
Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) as a proxy for the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed
firms. I use a public market proxy for two reasons. First, return data on publicly traded equity is
of better quality and available at a much higher frequency, allowing for high-frequency estimates
of idiosyncratic volatility shocks. The second reason is that using a measure from public markets
minimizes potential endogeneity concerns.2
There are a number of reasons to believe that the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms is
strongly related to that from public markets. First, Herskovic et. al. (2016) show that publicly
traded firms’ idiosyncratic volatility obeys a strong factor structure, i.e. that the level of idiosyn-
cratic volatility is highly correlated across firm sizes and industries. Additionally, they find that
the idiosyncratic volatility of small firms along with high-tech and health-related firms, the types of
firms typically financed by VC funds, are more sensitive to this common factor. Finally, I validate
the measure by comparing low frequency estimates of VC-backed firm idiosyncratic volatility to
similarly timed low frequency measures from publicly traded firms and show that these two series
move together strongly.
I begin the main empirical analysis by establishing that commonly used VC benchmark return
indexes load positively on idiosyncratic volatility shocks. In particular, factor regressions for these
VC indexes have significantly higher R2 when including idiosyncratic volatility shocks. In other
2One potential source of endogeneity is the fact that the amount of experimentation done by VCs, and therefore
the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms, may be endogenously determined by the amount of capital available
to VCs for investment as argued by Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013, 2016).
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words, idiosyncratic volatility shocks explain a large fraction of the variance of VC industry returns
after accounting for the fraction explained by market returns. I incorporate lagged regressors in
these factor regressions to account for asynchronous prices of privately traded firms as discussed
in Dimson (1979), and find that a one quarterly standard deviation innovation to the level of
idiosyncratic volatility corresponds to an approximately 8% return in the VC index. This effect is
even larger for a benchmark index of early-focused VC performance.
If the price of volatility risk is non-zero, this exposure has implications for the risk-adjusted
performance of VC investments. There is a large body of theoretical and empirical work3 that
suggests the price of volatility exposure is negative, i.e. that investors are willing to pay for exposure
to this risk. In this case, the positive exposure to this risk documented in this paper implies that
the risk-adjusted performance of VC investments is higher than previously believed. I test this
hypothesis by measuring the exposure of VC benchmark return indexes to a tradeable portfolio of
equity options constructed to proxy for idiosyncratic volatility risk, and find that accounting for
this tradeable factor increases the risk-adjusted performance of venture capital investments by as
much as 6% per year.
Next, in order to relate these shocks to investor cash flows directly and investigate the potential
channels driving this empirical relationship, I examine the exposure of individual venture capital
funds to changes in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. I use the realized cash flows between investors
and the VC funds in which they invest from Burgiss. This data is sourced from a diverse array of
limited partners (fund investors) for whom Burgiss provides investment decision support tools and
includes a complete transaction and valuation history between the LPs and fund investments.
The fund performance measure I use is the public market equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and
Schoar (2005), which accounts for the opportunity cost of capital.4 I find a significant relation
between fund PME and idiosyncratic volatility shocks over the life of the fund and, in particular,
those shocks that occur in years two and three of the fund’s life. This finding is consistent with the
reinvestment option channel, since by year two most initial investments will have been made, and
3See Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016).
4Specifically, the PME provides a valid economic performance measure when the LP has log-utility preferences and
the return on the LP’s total wealth equals the market portfolio (Sorensen and Jagannathan, 2015). I also examine
the effect of loosening these restrictions, as in, for example, Korteweg and Nagel (2016).
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by year 5 VC fund managers are looking to exit their positions. I also estimate the strength of this
exposure in funds with different investment focus. The relation is much stronger for those funds
which focus on early-stage investments, where reinvestment options inherently plays a larger role,
than in late-stage investment focused funds. In a placebo analysis, I show that buyout funds, which
buy target companies whole and therefore have no reinvestment options, exhibit no exposure to
volatility shocks. This suggests that exposure to aggregate idiosyncratic volatility is not a feature
of private equity investments more broadly.
At the level of VC investments into portfolio companies, I use cash-on-cash multiples and an-
nualized returns as the measures of performance, controlling throughout for public equity prices
(Tobin’s q) and returns. I find that investments made when idiosyncratic volatility is high do
not have higher average returns than those made at other times, consistent with the level of id-
iosyncratic volatility being priced into individual VC financing deals, as would be expected. What
does drive investment-level returns are shocks to the level of idiosyncratic volatility after the initial
investment. This relationship is again much stronger for early investment rounds, consistent with
the reinvestment channel. I also find that reinvestments happen faster and are more likely in times
of rising idiosyncratic volatility, suggesting that these innovations have a direct relationship with
the amount of capital available to entrepreneurs.
Taken together, these results imply a strong effect of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility shocks
on investment returns and dynamics in VC investments. This effect can help us to understand the
time-series of VC investment dynamics and rationalize the large differences in risk-adjusted returns
observed at different times in the existing literature. Moreover, the results imply that the real
options embedded in VC investments are a first-order determinant of risk in VC.
This paper relates to the literature surrounding the impact of contractual and informational
frictions on VC investments. In particular, Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) demonstrate
how the principal-agent problem between VCs and their investors cause private equity fund returns
to depend on diversifiable risk in the cross section of funds. This effect is distinct from the time-
series relationship investigated in this paper. In addition, their cross-sectional results hold for both
VC and buyout funds, while the results in this paper hold only for VC funds. This result makes
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sense because the reinvestment options which are the focus of this paper are only present in VC
investments. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show that staged financing helps to mitigate the problem
of manipulation for purposes of window-dressing. Fluck, Garrison, and Myers (2007) highlight the
role of staged financing as a real option and show that it alleviates the effort provision problem.
There is also a substantial literature on the risk and return characteristics of VC investments:
Cochrane (2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Hall and Woodward (2007), Korteweg and Sorensen
(2010), and Korteweg and Nagel (2016). A large literature on the implications of idiosyncratic
risk for entrepreneurs and managers is summarized by Heaton and Lucas (2004) and Hall and
Woodward (2010). This paper differs from the previous literature by explicitly accounting for the
role of idiosyncratic volatility in return dynamics.
This paper also relates to a large empirical literature on the role of idiosyncratic return volatility.
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) examine secular variation in average idiosyncratic return
volatility. Wei and Zhang (2006) study aggregate time-series variation in fundamental volatility.
Engle and Figlewski (2015) document a common factor in option-implied volatilities. Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) study measures of uncertainty from aggregate and firm-level data and
relates them to macroeconomic activity. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show that stocks
with high idiosyncratic volatility earn abnormally low average returns. This paper adds to this
literature by identifying VC as a sector that is particularly exposed to idiosyncratic volatility risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents two potential channels of volatility
exposure. Section 3 introduces the VC data and the idiosyncratic volatility measure and compares
public and private market idiosyncratic volatility. Section 4.1 presents empirical results using
VC-industry return indexes. Section 4.2 presents empirical results using investor cash flows while
section 4.3 presents empirical results using investment-level data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Sources of Volatility Exposure
This section briefly describes two potential channels through with VC investments may be exposed
to shocks to the volatility of their underlying assets. The first channel is through the liquidation
preference given to investors through the convertible preferred equity structure common to VC
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investments. This contractual feature of VC contracts induces both concavity and convexity in the
VC payoff, which can lead to volatility exposure. The second channel is the (real) reinvestment
option embedded in the contracts that VCs write with their portfolio companies. These contracts
frequently include a contractual right of participation in future investment rounds which can again
lead to a volatility exposure of the vale of the security. Both liquidation preferences and staged
investment emerge from the contracting environment with information asymmetry (Bergemann and
Hege (1998, 2005)), an inherent friction in the financing of small, private firms. A third potential
explanation of the idiosyncratic volatility exposure of VC is that the underlying assets, the portfolio
companies themselves, are positively exposed to volatility shocks.
2.1 Liquidation Preferences
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) report that of 213 rounds of financing, all but one contained some
form of liquidation preference. A standard specification of the liquidation preference takes the
following form in the National Venture Capital Association’s (NVCA) 2013 model term sheet:
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Company, the proceeds
shall be paid as follows: First pay [x] times the Original Purchase Price ... on each
share of Series A Preferred. Thereafter, the Series A Preferred participates with the
Common Stock pro rata on an as-converted basis.
Typically, the liquidation preference amounted to the lesser of the liquidation value of the firm
and the VC’s original investment (x = 1) and may include an unpaid cumulative dividend (45% of
cases) that raises this amount over time.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows a payoff diagram for a typical convertible preferred equity stake.5 The
dashed line represents the payoff to a participating convertible preferred equity investor holding
a certain ownership share in the firm (in this case 30%). The dashed (blue) line represents the
value before the final payoff is realized, as calculated using the Black-Scholes model assuming an
annualized volatility of 30% while the dotted (red) line assumes an annualized volatility of 100%,
5A number of theoretical papers rationalize this form of equity participation by investors, eg. Cornelli and Yosha
(2003), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007)
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which is close to the average idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms (see Section 3.5).6 The
distance between the dotted and solid lines represents the extrinsic value of the option and is
directly related to the volatility of the underlying asset. The volatility exposure, or vega, of a long
call option is positive and easily calculated as:
∂C
∂σ
= S
√
T
2π
e−(log(S/X)+(r+σ
2/2)T)
2
/(2σ2T ), (1)
where T is the time until option expiration, r is the interest rate, X is the strike price, σ is the
underlying volatility and S is the value of the firm. Panel (b) shows the vega of the convertible
preferred equity position.
Figure 1 shows that when the volatility is relatively low the direction of the volatility exposure
is ambiguous. However, when the volatility is high enough, and in particular is the level observed
for VC-backed firms, the negative volatility exposure of the concave part of the payoff is potentially
larger than that from the convex part. This implies that this particular contractual feature of VC
investments is unlikely to drive the positive volatility exposure of VC returns.
2.2 A Simple Model of Idiosyncratic Volatility and Reinvestment
An alternative potential driver of volatility exposure of VC investments lies in the (real) reinvest-
ment option, or the contractual right of participation in future investment rounds. The contractual
right of first refusal on future investment rounds takes the following form in the NVCA’s 2013
model term sheet:
“All Major Investors shall have a pro rata right, based on their percentage equity own-
ership in the Company (...), to participate in subsequent issuances of equity securities
of the Company (...). In addition, should any Major Investor choose not to purchase
its full pro rata share, the remaining Major Investors shall have the right to purchase
the remaining pro rata shares.”
6For purposes of this figure the option is assumed to be three years from expiration, the assumed dividend yield
and interest rate are zero.
7
I present a simple 3-period investment model with a risk-neutral, competitive investor and a
penniless entrepreneur. The timing is as follows. In period 1, the entrepreneur decides whether to
invest $1 in the project. If he invests he receives a share α1 of the project and receives a publicly
observed signal (λ) about the project payoff. In period 2 he can either invest an amount F or not.
If he decides not to invest the project dies (default) and he receives a payoff of zero. If he invests
he receives a share α2 of the project which dilutes his original stake. In period three the project
payoff (S) is realized.
In the simplest construction of this model, the signal λ is discrete and all information is public.
The payoff is S ∈ {SL, SH} where SL = µ−σ and SH = µ+σ with equal probabilities. The public
signal λ is informative about the type of the project:
P [λ = L|S = SL] = P [λ = H|S = SH ] = γ
The high payoff is more likely with a high signal:
P [S = µ+ σ|λ = H] = γ
where, without loss of generality, γ ∈ (0.5, 1] and a higher γ is associated with a more informative
signal. Then the expected payoff is
E[S|λ = H] = γ(µ+ σ) + (1− γ)(µ− σ) = µ− σ + 2γσ
E[S|λ = L] = (1− γ)(µ+ σ) + γ(µ− σ) = µ+ σ − 2γσ
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Solving the model by backward induction, the share that leaves the competitive investor indifferent
in the second period, if λ = H, is
αH2 =
F
µ− σ + 2γσ
and when λ = L:
αL2 =
F
µ+ σ − 2γσ
Of course, investment is only feasible in the case that α2 ∈ [0, 1]. Investment in the second round,
given a bad signal (λ = L), will only occur if F < µ− σ(2γ − 1) = F̄ .
In period one, the investor invests one dollar for a share α1, knowing this share will be diluted
if he invests in the next round, in which case his final ownership share will be (α2 + (1 − α2)α1).
The share α1 solves, in the case F > F̄
1 = 0.5((1− α2)α1)(µ− σ + 2γσ)
⇒ α1 =
2
µ+ σ(2γ − 1)− F
.
The share of the projects required as compensation for the initial investment (α1) is decreasing in
σ as long as 2γ − 1 > 0, which is true by assumption.
In the alternative case F < F̄ , the share α1 solves
1 = 0.5((1− αH2 )α1)(µ− σ + 2γσ) + 0.5((1− αL2 )α1)(µ+ σ − 2γσ)
⇒ α1 =
1
µ− F
.
Figure 2 shows comparative statics for this simple model. Panel (a) shows the shares acquired
in each period and state as a function of the risk (σ) of the underlying asset. Panel (b) shows
the post-money valuation in each state as a function of the risk. It is easy to see that as long as
reinvestment depends on the realization of the signal the value of the firm is increasing in the risk
of the underlying asset.
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Model Takeaways
The model formalizes the intuition that the real option to reinvest or abandon is valuable and that
its value rises with the volatility of the underlying asset. Since the investor is perfectly competitive,
the entrepreneur retains all of the surplus generated by the project, though in the real world one
may expect either private information or other form of market power on the part of the investor to
cause a more even split in surplus. Regardless, once the initial investment is made, any increase in
the volatility of the asset σ will lead to an increased valuation for the investor.
Specifically, this simple model makes the time-series prediction that reinvestment options lead
innovations to the level of asset volatility, after the initial investment and before the final invest-
ment, to increase investment performance. This prediction is distinct from that of, for example,
Ewens, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) who investigate the implications of a principal-agent prob-
lem between investors and private equity firms. This friction drives a cross-sectional relationship
between diversifiable risk and fund performance. These authors find that this relationship holds for
both VC and buyout funds, as predicted by their model. Reinvestment options, in contrast, imply
a time-series relationship only for VC firms, who retain reinvestment options, and not for buyout
funds, who purchase going concerns.
3 Data Sources and Methodology
This section describes the data sources used in this paper. I use data on VC returns and investments
at three levels of aggregation. First, I describe VC return indexes from Cambridge Associates (CA)
and Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE), meant to proxy for the returns to investing in VC in aggregate.
Second, I describe the private equity fund cash flow data from Burgiss. These are the realized cash
flows experienced by investors into private equity funds. Third, I describe the investment-level
data from the VentureSource database. These data describe the individual investments made by
VC firms into their individual portfolio companies and the outcomes of these investments. I also
describe construction of the measure of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility used throughout the paper
and a measure of the level of idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed portfolio companies.
10
3.1 Venture Capital Indexes
I use data on aggregate returns in the VC industry from Cambridge Associates and Sand Hill Econo-
metrics. Cambridge Associates (CA) provides a quarterly net-of-fees VC returns series derived from
disclosures by VC firm general partners. CA does not disclose what fraction of the universe of pos-
sible investments their data cover. One potential concern with the CA VC return index is that
it is subject to asynchronous prices resulting from the fact that VCs infrequently update (mark
to market) the value of their portfolio holdings. This is due to the fact that fair (market) value
of privately held companies is only observed when a new transaction for shares in the portfolio
company takes place, at which point the valuation of previously held shares is adjusted.7 Those
portfolio companies that do not experience a valuation event are left at the previous “stale” val-
uation. This reporting convention causes net asset values, and therefore the returns reported by
Cambridge Associates, to appear smoother and less correlated with market returns than are the
unobservable true returns. This asynchronous trading problem has been studied by, for example,
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994). Risk factors in the
presence of asynchronous prices can be recovered by projecting returns on contemporaneous and
lagged factor returns and summing the estimated coefficients (Dimson 1979). Woodward (2009)
contains a detailed example of this mechanism at work in VC data and estimates risk loadings in
the CA VC indexes. Section 4.1 describes the quantitative effect of this correction. Korteweg and
Sorensen (2010) propose an alternative correction which I discuss in Section 3.5.
I use five different return indexes provided by Cambridge Associates. The first is meant to proxy
for returns in the VC industry as a whole. Three other indexes are meant to proxy for returns of
VC funds with different investment strategies: early-, multi- and late-focused VC funds. The final
index proxies for the returns to buyout funds.
Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) provides a monthly gross-of-fees return series derived from the
individual VC investments (VentureSource, discussed below) rather than the net asset values re-
ported by VC funds. SHE makes an effort to remove any bias introduced by asynchronous prices
7In the VentureSource data, described below, the median (mean) time between consecutive financing rounds is 16
(21) months.
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by interpolating values between rounds, using market indications of change in values. Details on
SHE index construction are in Blosser and Woodward (2014).
3.2 Venture Capital Fund Cash Flow Data
VC fund performance data are from Burgiss, a global provider of investment decision support
tools for the private capital market, and are described in detail by Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan
(2014). The Burgiss dataset contains the complete transactional history for over 6,800 private
capital funds with a total capitalization representing over $4.7 trillion in committed capital across
the full spectrum of private capital strategies. Kaplan and Lerner (2016) report that the Burgiss
dataset is the likely the best available dataset of its type, with a non-selected sample and very
high coverage. The Burgiss dataset is representative of actual investor experience, as the data are
sourced exclusively from limited partners, avoiding any reporting biases introduced by sourcing
data from general partner surveys. I focus my analysis on a sample of 914 VC funds first raised
before 2011. Of these funds, 513 are designated as early stage funds, 118 as late stage funds and
the remaining 283 are designated as balanced funds. Cash flows include draw-downs, flows from
investors to VC funds, as well as distributions, flows from funds back to investors.
3.2.1 The Public Market Equivalent
The public market equivalent (“PME”), introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), is a measure that
evaluates fund performance based on cash flows. As discussed in Sorensen and Jagannathan (2015),
which this discussion largely follows, the PME provides a valid economic performance measure when
the investor (the limited partner or “LP”) has log-utility preferences and the return on the LPs
total wealth equals the market return. When these conditions hold, the PME is a valid performance
measure regardless of the risk of PE investments, and it is robust to variations in the timing and
systematic risks of the underlying cash flows along with potential GP manipulations.
The PME calculation works as follows: Let X(t) denote the cash flow from the fund to the LP
at time t. This cash-flow stream is divided into its positive and negative parts, called distributions,
dist(t), and capital capital draw-downs, draw(t). A distribution is a cash flow that is returned to
the LP from the PE fund (net of fees) after the fund successfully sells a company. Capital draw-
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downs are the investments by the LP into the fund, including management fees. Distributions and
draw-downs are then discounted using the realized market returns over the same time periods, and
the PME is the ratio of the two resulting valuations:
PME =
∑
t
dist(t)
1+rM (t)∑
t
draw(t)
1+rM (t)
.
The sum runs over the life of the fund and rM (t) is the realized market return. A PME greater
than one suggests that the value of the distributions exceeds the cost of the capital calls, meaning
the LP has benefited from the investment relative to the performance of the market.
3.3 Portfolio Company Data
Venture capital-backed company data are from the VentureSource database, maintained by Dow
Jones. The full dataset contains 102,255 financing events for 30,689 companies, including seed,
early, mezzanine and late round investments by VC firms, acquisitions by other companies and
initial public offering (IPO) events. Most VC financings are syndicated, ie. involve more than one
VC firm financing the company.
To calculate company-level investment returns requires data on exit valuation (either IPO or
acquisition price) as well as the investment amount and fraction acquired for all rounds between
the initial round and exit. Following the literature on investment-level VC returns, (e.g., Cochrane
(2005), Korteweg and Sorensen (2010)), I calculate the gross multiple Mi,t as:
Mi,t =
Vi
V Posti,t
T∏
s=t+1
Di,s,
where T is the total number of dilutive financing rounds, Vi is the exit valuation, V
Post
i,t is the post-
money valuation for the round, and Di,s is the dilutive factor for each round, which is calculated
as 1−Ki,s/V Posti,s , where Ki,s is the total capital raised in financing round s.
As noted by Ewens, Rhodes-Kropf and Strebulaev (2016), investments that eventually have an
initial public offering have a relatively higher probability of their valuation being reported. In
contrast, acquisitions are much less likely to have prices and returns reported. As IPO returns tend
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to exceed those of acquisitions, this leads to positive selection in any VC returns data. Conversely,
acquisition returns are underrepresented in the sample of observed returns. I address this concern
by following the Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) approach of re-weighting the observed returns using
the true exit weights in the full sample.
3.4 Public Market Idiosyncratic Volatility
One potential concern with using idiosyncratic volatility to explain VC investment returns and
investment dynamics is the fact that the idiosyncratic volatility of VC-backed firms may be en-
dogenously determined by the amount of VC investment through, for example, an experimentation
channel as argued by Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013, 2016). For this reason, I construct a mea-
sure from public market return data. Data on public equity market returns is from the Center for
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) as reported by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
I construct a monthly measure of average idiosyncratic volatility that follows the measure doc-
umented in Herskovic et. al. (2016). The Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) is constructed
using data from the daily CRSP stock file for the years 1975-2014. Idiosyncratic returns are con-
structed within each calendar month τ by estimating a factor model using all observations within
the month and takes the form:
rit = γ
iFt + ε
i
t
where t denotes a daily observation in month τ . Idiosyncratic volatility for each firm is calculated
as the variance of the residuals εit within each month. The return factor model is purely statistical
and specifies Ft as a constant and the first five principal components of the cross section of returns
within the month. CIV is calculated as the equally-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility across
firms.
I deviate from Herskovic et. al (2016) by measuring idiosyncratic volatility shocks as statistical
innovations from the following ARMA(1,1) model on the level of CIV
σ2t = c+ ε
CIV
t + ϕσ
2
t−1 + θε
CIV
t−1 ,
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whereas Herskovic et. al. (2016) construct CIV shocks as first-differences in the level of CIV,
assuming a unit root. I estimate that the autoregressive coefficient ϕ is 0.936 and statistically
different from unity (t = 3.85) and the moving average coefficient θ is -0.090 (t = −2.81).
When regressions are at the quarterly or annual level, CIV shocks are measured as the average
of the monthly CIV shocks over the quarter or year. Figure 3 shows quarterly CIV over time along
with the VIX, a measure of systematic volatility. The correlation between the two series is 0.49
while the correlation between CIV shocks and similarly constructed VIX shocks is significantly
lower (0.1).
3.5 Measuring Private Company Idiosyncratic Volatility
In order to validate the public market proxy (CIV) for the volatility of VC-backed firms, I compare
low frequency estimates of the level of idiosyncratic volatility in these firms to similarly timed low
frequency estimates from public markets. This section follows directly from Korteweg and Sorensen
(2010); see their paper for details. These authors develop a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
estimation technique to estimate the risk and return characteristics of VC-backed company equity,
incorporating a selection model to account for the fact that equity prices are observed infrequently
and endogenously. This dynamic selection problem arises because valuations of these companies
are observed only in the event that the company receives additional financing, either through a
VC round or an initial public offering (IPO). They find that accounting for dynamic selection
dramatically affects estimates of the market model parameters.
Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) address dynamic selection by simultaneously estimating the fol-
lowing two-equation model:
v(t) = v(t− 1) + r + δ + β(rm(t)− r) + ε(t) (2)
w(t) = Z ′(t)γ0 + v(t)γv + η(t) (3)
where, in equation 2, v(t) is the log valuation at time t, r is the risk-free rate, rm(t) is the market
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return and β is the factor loading on the market portfolio. They define
δ = a− 1
2
σ2 +
1
2
β(1− β)σ2m (4)
where σ and σ2m are the variance of the asset and market return, respectively, and a is the excess
return of the asset. It is easy to see that a simple rearranging of equation 2 delivers something
similar to the usual capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Valuations are only observed when a company has an event and equation 3 captures this selection
process. Valuation is only observed when the latent selection variable w(t) is greater than zero. The
vector Z(t) contains characteristics that affect refinancing and exit events and the error term η(t)
is normalized to have variance of one. The estimation technique uses a Bayesian Gibbs sampling
procedure to estimate the parameters of the model δ, β, σ2, γ0 and γv.
I use this method to estimate the level of idiosyncratic volatility (σ) in VC portfolio companies
over time. Figure 4 shows these estimates along with 4-year averages of CIV. The horizontal
axis represents the cohort being studied, with some overlap to smooth out the estimates. For
example, the 1996Q2 cohort was first financed between January and September 1996. I estimate the
idiosyncratic volatility of these firms until exit. The solid line represents the annualized idiosyncratic
volatility of this cohort and the dashed lines represent the Bayesian confidence interval. Since the
median VC-backed firm exits in about 4 years, I compare these estimates with average CIV over 4
years starting in the same quarter. The correlation between the two measures is 0.81, implying a
substantial amount of commonality in the movement in idiosyncratic volatility between public and
private markets. This result builds confidence in using a volatility measure derived from public
equity markets.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 VC Industry Risk Exposures
I begin the empirical analysis by establishing that VC return indexes from two commonly used
sources load on idiosyncratic volatility shocks. The first source is Cambridge Associates (CA) who
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report a number of net-of-fees VC indexes meant to benchmark for the VC industry as a whole as
well as those VCs with specific investment focuses. CA also reports a benchmark index for buyout
funds. The second source is Sand Hill Econometrics who report a gross-of-fees VC return index
meant to proxy for the returns VC firms themselves earn from their portfolio companies. I then
discuss the implications for expected returns of VC investments if the price of volatility risk is
non-zero.
4.1.1 Net-of-fees VC Index from Cambridge Associates
Regression results using the net-of-fees VC return indexes from Cambridge Associates are presented
in Table 1. To see the effect of asynchronous prices empirically, consider the näıve CAPM regression
in column (1):
rCAt = α+ βM (r
m
t − r
f
t ) + εt.
We can see that the CAPM results imply that the market beta of VC is a small 0.47 and that the
VC industry delivers a quarterly alpha of 2.58 percentage points. The problem with this result,
as discussed in Section 3.1, is that the returns to VC as reported by CA are related both to
contemporaneous and lagged market returns because of return smoothing and asynchronous prices.
These features of VC portfolios lead to large serial correlation in the VC returns reported by CA.
We can address asynchronous prices by including lagged market returns in the regression as
suggested by Dimson (1979):
rCAt = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − r
f
t−τ ) + εt.
For example, columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 report regression results including additional lags of
the market return. The sum of the coefficient estimates is reported in the row labeled
∑
β. Here we
can see that the lagged market returns enter with positive and statistically significant coefficients,
indicating that VC industry returns depend on contemporaneous and lagged market returns because
of asynchronous prices. The sum of the betas, representing the true market exposure, is 1.39 and
the risk-adjusted alpha is close to zero, once we account for asynchronous prices. The largest and
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most statistically significant lagged return coefficients are those on the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter lagged
market returns.
To study the impact of idiosyncratic volatility shocks on VC returns, I additionally include
contemporaneous and lagged CIV shocks to the regression:
rCAt − r
f
t = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − r
f
t−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt. (5)
These shocks have been normalized to have a quarterly standard deviation of one. Column (4) of
Table 1 reports results from this regression. The sum of the coefficient estimates on the CIV shocks
is reported in the row labeled
∑
δ. We can see that past innovations in idiosyncratic volatility have
a significant effect on VC returns as reported by CA. The sum of the coefficients on the idiosyncratic
volatility shock in column (4) is 7.757, implying that a positive one-standard deviation shock to the
level of idiosyncratic volatility corresponds to approximately an 8 percentage point return to VC
investors. The row labeled “F” is the p-value from an F-test whose null hypothesis is that the sum
of the coefficients on the CIV shock is zero, which we can easily reject at conventional levels. It is
also interesting to note that the lagged CIV shocks with the largest and most statistically significant
coefficients are those on the 2-, 3- and 4-quarter lagged shocks, similar to the lagged market return
coefficients. The increase in the R2 between columns (3) and (4) is 0.104, implying that CIV shocks
explain a substantial portion of the return variance not explained by the market. Note that, once I
include the idiosyncratic volatility shocks in the return regressions, the regression intercept can no
longer be interpreted as a return, since the CIV shocks are statistical innovations and not tradeable
portfolios. See Section 4.1.3 below for a discussion of the implications for risk-adjusted expected
returns.
The remaining columns in Table 1 report results for other return indexes reported by Cambridge
Associates. Columns (5), (6) and (7) report results for indexes constructed from early-, balanced-
and late-focused funds, respectively. While all three VC strategy indexes load significantly on the
CIV shocks, the loading for the early-focused fund index is much larger than that for the balanced-
or late-focused fund indexes (9.78 versus 3.69 and 4.81, respectively). Early-focused VC funds also
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have a larger loading on the market return than late-focused funds. The final column in Table 1
reports results from the same regression where the dependent variable is now the benchmark return
for leveraged buyout funds. In contrast to the results for VC indexes, the buyout index does not
load significantly on CIV shocks.
To confirm that it is truly idiosyncratic volatility, rather than systematic volatility, driving the
results I run untabulated regressions including contemporaneous and lagged measures of both CIV
shocks and VIX shocks, where VIX shocks are measured as ARMA(1,1) innovations to the level of
VIX. Shocks to the level of systematic volatility enter the regression insignificantly whether or not
the regression includes CIV shocks. In contrast, shocks to CIV enter strongly significantly whether
or not VIX shocks are included in the regressions.
4.1.2 Gross-of-fees VC Index from SHE
I also investigate the idiosyncratic volatility exposure of the VC return index from Sand Hill Econo-
metrics (SHE). SHE provides a monthly, gross-of-fees VC return index that has been constructed to
account for asynchronous prices as discussed in Blosser and Woodward (2014) and Woodward and
Hall (2004). This series is constructed to measure the monthly return of a value-weighted portfolio
of VC-backed companies, while the CA indexes discussed above are meant to represent averages of
returns to investments in venture capital funds.
Factor regression results for this index are presented in Table 2. To establish a baseline for
this index, column (1) shows the results for the Fama French 3-factor model. The SHE index
has a large loading on the market return and a negative loading on the HML portfolio. While the
contemporaneous CIV shock doesn’t enter significantly (column (2)), lagged CIV shocks do seem to
be significantly related to VC returns as measured by this index (Columns (3) and (4)). While only
a few of the lagged CIV shocks are significant individually, their sum is large and highly significant.
The summed value of the lags is 1.69, implying that a one standard deviation monthly CIV shock
is associated with a 1.69% return. The row labeled “F” is again the p-value from an F-test whose
null hypothesis is that the sum of the lagged CIV coefficients is zero.
The fact that the lagged exposure of the SHE index to CIV shocks is positive indicates that
the SHE procedure does not purge VC investment returns of their lagged exposure to idiosyncratic
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volatility.
4.1.3 Implications for Expected Returns
The implications of volatility exposure for risk-adjusted VC returns depend on the price of id-
iosyncratic volatility risk. Herskovic et. al. (2016) present evidence showing that the level of
idiosyncratic volatility proxies for idiosyncratic income risk faced by households and thus argue
that the price of volatility risk is negative, i.e. that investors are willing to accept lower returns for
assets have positive return exposure to aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. This is because such an
exposure would hedge their own exposure to idiosyncratic income risk. In this case the inclusion
of this priced risk will increase the risk-adjusted expected returns of VC investments.
To test this hypothesis, I run a regression like that in Eq. (5) but using a tradeable portfolio
that is exposed to the level of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. I construct such a portfolio by
taking an equally weighted position in 91-day straddle positions in S&P 500 constituents on the
last trading day of each quarter. The construction of the option straddle portfolio is detailed in
the appendix. This option portfolio delivers a mean return of -2.46% per quarter with a standard
deviation of 21% for an annualized Sharpe ratio of -0.23. The average risk-adjusted return and
Sharpe ratio are virtually unchanged in a Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Regression results are
in Table 3. Since option prices on individual stocks are only available beginning in 1996, there are
many fewer observations.
I start by re-running the analysis of Table 1 column (3) in column (1) of Table 3 to give a
baseline for the estimates of market slope and intercept, which are both somewhat higher in this
time period, relative to the estimates from the longer time period in Table 1. Column (2) adds
the contemporaneous and lagged returns on the option straddle portfolio. The sum of coefficient
estimates is a very statistically significant 0.70. Since the explanatory variables are all market
returns, the intercept of the regression can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted excess return. Including
the option straddle portfolio increases the intercept to a marginally significant 2.52% per quarter,
which corresponds to an annualized increase of about 6% per year. In unreported regressions, I
find that if CIV shocks are included in the regression along with returns on the option straddle
portfolio, the loadings on the option portfolio returns become insignificant while the loadings on
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the CIV shocks remain quite significant. This suggests that whatever explanatory power the option
portfolio has is fully subsumed by the actual idiosyncratic volatility shocks.
Columns (3)-(5) repeat the analysis for early-, balanced- and late-focused VC funds respectively.
The patterns are similar to those in Table 1 in that the coefficient estimates on the idiosyncratic
volatility proxy are largest for the early-focused VC fund benchmark. Column (6) repeats the
analysis for the buyout fund benchmark, which does not load significantly on the option portfolio
return.
4.2 Investment Sample Results
To understand the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on individual VC investments, I next use the
cash flows from individual VC funds. VC fund cash flow data has two large advantages over the
industry indexes studied above. First, the funds are investment vehicles and the reported cash flows
are the actual cash flows that investors receive. Given the illiquid nature of private equity funds,
it is important to take the timing of cash flows into account. The second large benefit of using
individual fund cash flows is that it allows an investigation into when, during a funds life, asset
volatility shocks matter the most. This will in turn allow a better understanding of the mechanism
driving this unique risk exposure.
I begin by regressing the PME on the average level and innovations to idiosyncratic volatility.
The basic empirical specification is as follows:
PMEi = α+ βCIVi + εi (6)
where PMEi is calculated from quarterly fund cash flows and CIVi is a measure of the level of
or innovation in CIV scaled by the cross sectional standard deviation. Results are in Table 4.
Panel A reports results for regressions of PME on the average level of CIV over the fund life, from
the month the fund was founded through the last cash flow has been distributed, an average of
ten years. In the first column, labeled “VC”, the sample is VC funds covered by Burgiss. The
positive and statistically significant coefficient implies that funds earn higher returns relative to
public market equity when the level of CIV is higher over the life of the fund. The coefficient
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of 0.204 implies that funds that experience lifetime idiosyncratic volatility one standard deviation
above (the cross-sectional) average outperform public markets by over 20% more than average over
the course of the fund’s life.
The other columns of panel A investigate the same regression in subsamples. VC funds in
Burgiss are designated as early-, late- or balanced-focus funds, depending on what stage their
portfolio companies are in when the funds first invest. We should expect idiosyncratic volatility
exposure to be largest for those VC funds that invest in early-stage investments, since these funds
are more likely to have reinvestment opportunities. The other columns in panel A show that this is
indeed the case: the coefficient on average CIV for early stage funds is larger and more significant
than for the other fund types. Late stage funds have an insignificant loading on average CIV, as
do buyout funds.
Panels B and C of Table 4 show results for regressions of PME on average CIV shocks. CIV
shocks are calculated as documented in section 3.4. In panel B, CIV shocks are averaged over the
life of the fund. Results using CIV shocks averaged over the fund life are similar to those using level,
which is reasonable considering the level reflects accumulated shocks. In particular, the pattern of
early stage-focused VC fund performance being more exposed to idiosyncratic volatility remains.
In unreported regressions, I include the initial level of CIV at fund initiation. This additional
explanatory variable enters insignificantly, implying that any information about future expected
volatility contained in the level is fully incorporated into the price of fund investments.
Private equity funds usually last for about 10 years. Therefore the idiosyncratic volatility shocks
that I have investigated so far are averaged over those very long time periods. Panel C of Table 4
investigates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility shocks averaged over the 12th through 48th month
of the fund’s life, the time when reinvestments are most likely to happen. The coefficient estimates
and R2 are significantly higher when we focus on this period of the fund life. Focusing on the
full VC sample (column 1), I find that funds that experience idiosyncratic volatility one standard
deviation above (the cross-sectional) average in years two through four of fund life outperform
public markets by almost 40% more that average over the course of the fund’s life. This rises to
53% when we consider the subsample of early-focused funds. This is equivalent to an annual return
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of 4.3% over a ten year fund. The R2 for this sample implies that the time-series of CIV shocks
explains over 5% of the cross-sectional variance of early-focused VC funds.
For a more granular look, I next regress VC fund performance on multiple CIV shocks, one
for each of the first seven years the fund was in operation. To build these shocks, I average the
monthly CIV shock across each fund year. For example, if a fund was first raised in June 1995,
the first CIV shock is measured as the average monthly CIV shock from July 1995 through June
1996, the second is from July 1996 through June 1997, etc. The explanatory variables are again
scaled so that one is equivalent to a single cross-sectional standard deviation. Results are in Figure
5 which shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence bounds on these estimates. We can see
that the impact of CIV shocks starts positive and marginally statistically significant, is highest and
highly significant in years 3 and 4 of the funds life, and falls close to zero by year 6. Together these
results suggest that CIV shocks help explain VC fund performance and that this effect is stronger
during the period when VC funds are likely to have already made investments and to be exercising
reinvestment options.
I next ask what the implication of these fund-level regression results is for the time-series of VC
fund performance. Using the same Burgiss dataset that underlies this section, Harris, Jenkinson
and Kaplan (2014) find that “Average VC fund returns in the United States [...] outperformed
public equities in the 1990s but have underperformed public equities in the most recent decade.”
Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) document a similar pattern in the returns of VC-backed companies.
Accounting for ex-post realized shocks to the aggregate level of idiosyncratic volatility can help to
explain these patterns.
Figure 6 shows mean and median fund performance, as measured by PME, along with the pre-
dicted performance given realized CIV shocks. The dashed (red) line is the mean fund performance
and the dotted (blue) line is the median fund performance for funds within each vintage cohort.
The mean is generally higher than the median due to the skewed performance of VC funds. Vin-
tage year is defined by the date of the first fund cash flow. These realized performance measures,
solid black line, are matched with fitted performance measures from regression Equation 6 where
the measure of CIV used is average over the 12th through 48th month as in Panel C of Table 4.
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The fitted performance demonstrates that, given the ex-post realized CIV shocks, the difference in
relative performance over time is not as large as previously believed.
4.2.1 Alternative β benchmarks
One potential concern with the PME measures introduced in section 3.2.1 and used in section 4.2
is that the relevant benchmark for VC funds may not be a market index with a β of unity. To
address this concern, I repeat the analysis or section 4.2 using market benchmarks with different
levels of market exposure. Results are in Table 5 and indicate that the broader pattern remains no
matter what β benchmark is used.
4.3 Portfolio Company Sample Results
The final data set I investigate is Dow Jones VentureSource, discussed in Section 3.2. I focus on a
sample of 111,766 investments by 1,615 VC firms into 19,638 individual portfolio companies made
between 1990 and 2011. There are 47,411 financing events, most of which involve more than one
investor. I require a VC firm to participate in at least ten financing rounds to enter the sample. I
match these financing events with public market condition. Public market data are from the web
page of Kenneth French and CRSP. Corporate accounting data are from Compustat. To measure
average market prices of public firms I calculate an average measure of Tobin’s q that incorporates
intangible assets in the denominator from Peters and Taylor (2016). Market returns (rmt,t+1) are
value weighted and measured over the following year and are calculated using the CRSP universe.
Summary Statistics are presented in Table 6.
The variables IPO and DEF are indicators for whether the company has had a successful IPO
or default respectively. A company is identified as having defaulted if it is listed as out of business,
in bankruptcy, or has been otherwise identified by VentureSource as not active. A company is also
labeled as having defaulted if it received the first VC funding prior to 2004, has yet to exit by the
end of the sample, and has never had a successful exit event. I designate a round as an early stage
investment if VentureSource identifies the round as being either a seed, angel or first round and
a late stage round otherwise, 29.2% of the sample. The variable ‘supply” is the quarterly flow of
capital into the VC sector as reported by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). In all
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regressions in this section, CIVt and Qt are measured at the date of financing, ε
CIV
t,t+1 is the sum of
monthly CIV shocks over the year following the first financing and rmt,t+1 is the market return over
this same period.
I begin my analysis of company-level data with a consistency check: do firms funded in times
of high idiosyncratic volatility experience more extreme investment outcomes? To investigate this
question I identify extreme outcomes as a firm having either an observed default or an IPO. Table
7 regresses these firm outcomes on various firm characteristics and aggregate conditions. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is an indicator for firm default, and coefficient estimates
are expressed in percentage points. Column (1) regresses this variable on the level of CIV at the
first financing round, the Industry Q of small, high-tech firms in the quarter of financing, and
innovations to both the level of CIV and market price. The coefficient estimates indicate that
companies first financed in times of high prices and high idiosyncratic volatility are more likely to
default. Column (2) includes a number of company-level control variables: The firm age at first
financing as reported by VentureSource, the size of the investing syndicate, the log dollars raised
and whether the company is based in California or Massachusetts. Including these variables does
not qualitatively impact the result. Column (3) adds industry fixed effects to the regression, which
does not change the results appreciably.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 studies the effect of market conditions at first financing on firms’
probability of successfully completing an IPO. This is generally considered the best outcome for a
VC-backed company. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the firm has a successful
IPO, again expressed in percentage points. Column (4) shows that firms first financed in high
CIV times are more likely to successfully IPO. Interestingly, average stock prices (at time of first
financing) do not seem to greatly impact the probability that VC-backed firms successfully IPO,
implying that the increase observed in columns (1)-(3) comes primarily from a decrease in the
number of firms acquired. Finally, firms first financed in times of high VC fund supply are markedly
less likely to successfully IPO. Including additional firm-level controls and industry fixed effects, as
in columns (5) and (6) do not change these results.
I next investigate how changes in underlying asset volatility relate to changes in the VC in-
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vestment process. Table 8 reports results for regressions on the frequency of reinvestment. The
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the same VC firm has a follow-on investment after
the round. In general, VC financing relationships are stable in the sense that the same VC firm
will usually continue to finance the firm after making an initial investment. The results in Columns
(1)-(3) of Table 8 indicate that rising idiosyncratic volatility (εCIVt,t+1) and market prices (r
m
t,t+1) after
the financing round are associated with a greater probability of their being a follow-on financing
event from the same VC firm. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(8) repeat the analysis in early and late
rounds, respectively, where early rounds are those that VentureSource has Identified as being seed,
angel or first rounds of investments. In general, early investment rounds are more likely to be in-
volve follow-on investments (65% vs. 52%) and the results in Table 8 imply that these probabilities
are also more strongly related to public market conditions. A one-standard-deviation movement in
idiosyncratic volatility is associated with a 4% greater probability of follow-on financing for early
rounds, while the probability of follow-on financing does not change for late financing rounds. Mar-
ket returns also have a greater impact on early financing rounds, with a one standard deviation
move in market prices associated with a 6% change in the probability of follow-on financing for
early rounds and only a 1.3%-1.9% change in later rounds.
Table 9 investigates whether, conditional on there being a follow-on financing round, how does
the time until that round relate to any changes in underlying asset volatility. The dependent
variable, time until the next financing round, is measured as the natural logarithm of the number
of days until the next round. The results imply that, conditional on a new financing round occurring,
the round is significantly faster in times of rising asset volatility as well as in times of rising market
prices.
Finally, I investigate whether realized asset volatility shocks are correlated with returns for
individual portfolio company investments. In the theoretical motivation in Section 2, the presence
of a reinvestment option implies that the returns should depend on innovations to idiosyncratic
volatility after the company is first financed, and not on the level of idiosyncratic volatility at the
time of financing. To test this hypothesis, I regress gross cash multiples on levels and innovations
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of both CIV and market prices:
Mi,t = γ0 + γ1CIVt + γ2ε
CIV
t,t+1 + γ3Qt + γ4r
m
t,t+1 + δX + ηi,t.
The variable X is a potential vector of company characteristics and fixed effects.
Results for this regression are in Table 10. Starting with column (1), which does not include
firm-level controls or fixed effects, we can see that the coefficient on the level of CIV at first financing
enters insignificantly, consistent with the theoretical motivation. The level of asset volatility appears
to be priced into portfolio company investments, consistent with competitive financing markets.
The innovation to CIV (εCIVt,t+1), on the other hand, enters positively and significantly. Market
prices enter similarly, with the coefficient Tobin’s Q entering with only marginal significance and
market returns after the investment strongly statistically significant. Columns (2) and (3) include
company-level controls and industry fixed effects, neither of which materially impact these results
dramatically. Columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) repeat the analysis in early and late rounds, respectively.
Similar to the results reported in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the return of early-stage investments are
much more strongly related to innovations in asset volatility than those for late investment rounds.
5 Conclusion
The contractual arrangements through which VC firms invest in their portfolio companies, in par-
ticular the real option embedded in staged financing, lead these funds to be exposed to changes
in the idiosyncratic volatility of these companies. The idiosyncratic return volatility of these com-
panies is, in turn, exposed to aggregate levels of idiosyncratic volatility through a common factor
structure. I find that this channel explains a significant fraction of the historical performance of
VC investments.
At the asset class level, VC indexes from Cambridge Associates and Sand Hill Econometrics show
significant exposure to idiosyncratic volatility shocks, with a one standard deviation quarterly shock
leading to an 8% return in the CA index. This loading is even larger for a benchmark index of
early stage investment focused funds and is smaller for balanced- and late-focused funds. An index
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of buyout funds shows no exposure to idiosyncratic volatility shocks. I repeat the analysis using
a tradeable proxy for idiosyncratic volatility shocks constructed from equity options and find that
the exposure to this proxy increases risk-adjusted excess returns. One possible interpretation of
this result is that investors who ignore this valuable risk exposure undervalue the returns to venture
capital investments.
At the investment level, I find that positive innovations to idiosyncratic volatility that occur
during the fund’s life lead to greater fund performance relative to a market benchmark, and that
the shocks with the greatest impact are those that occur in years three and four of the fund’s
life. Again, funds that focus on early-stage investments, i.e. those with more reinvestment options,
experience much greater performance exposure to idiosyncratic volatility shocks.
At the level of individual portfolio company investments, I find that the average cash multiple
is greater for those investments that experience positive innovations to idiosyncratic volatility early
in their lives, but that the level of idiosyncratic volatility does not predict returns, consistent with
rational and competitive pricing in the market for entrepreneurial finance.
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Figure 1: Panel (a) shows the intrinsic and total value of convertible preferred equity stake. The
solid line is that payoff that the holder of the the convertible preferred equity receives at a given exit
value. The dashed (blue) and dotted (red) lines are the value of holding the convertible preferred
equity as calculated using the Black-Scholes model. The dashed blue and dotted red lines assumes
an annualized volatility of 0.3 and 1.0, respectively. For both lines the interest rate and dividend
yields are zero and the time to expiration is three years. Panel (b) shows the vega, or volatility
exposure, of the convertible preferred equity as calculated in Eq. 1 for the same parameter values.
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Figure 2: This figure presents comparative statics for the model presented in Section 2.2. Panel
(a) shows the shares that the investors receive for their investment as a function of the risk of the
underlying cash flow while panel (b) shows the implied valuations that these shares represent.
(a) (b)
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Figure 3. Observed CIV and VIX. CIV is calculated as the equally-weighted average idiosyncratic
volatility across firms from a five principal components market model. VIX is the CBOE Volatility
Index, a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. VIX is calculated by the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
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Figure 4. Estimates of Portfolio Company Idiosyncratic Volatility. This figure plots low-frequency
estimates of idiosyncratic volatility measured in public (dotted black line) and private markets
(solid blue line). Bayesian 95% posterior confidence intervals are denoted by dashed black lines.
The estimates of public market idiosyncratic volatility are 4-year averages, staring at the date
represented on the horizontal axis, of CIV as measured in public equity markets. The measure
of private market idiosyncratic volatility is estimated on cohorts of portfolio companies using the
Bayesian MCMC method of Korteweg and Sorensen (2010). A cohort is all VC-backed firms first
financed in the three quarters around the date represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis
is the annualized standard deviation of idiosyncratic volatility.
35
Figure 5. Coefficients of regression of PME on averages of CIV shocks. Figure reports coefficient
estimates and confidence bounds from the following regression:
PMEi = α+
6∑
τ=0
βCIVi,t+τ + εi
where PMEi is the public market equivalent of firm i as measured using the method of Kaplan
and Schoar (2005) from fund cash flows and CIVi,t+τ is the average (over monthly observations)
CIV shock in year t + τ where year t is the year of fund formation. Standard errors are clustered
by venture capital firm and robust to heteroscedasticity.
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Figure 6. Average and predicted performance of VC funds by vintage. Vintage years are defined
by the date of the first fund cash flow. Performance is measured as the public market equivalent
(PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) from Burgiss fund cash flows. The dashed (red) line is the
mean PME of funds first raised in each vintage year. The dotted (blue) line is the median PME.
The solid line is the (ex-post) predicted average performance of VC funds in each year conditional
on future realizations of CIV shocks.
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Table 1
CIV Exposure of VC Industry Returns
Statistics are based on quarterly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported by Cam-
bridge Associates (CA), on contemporaneous and lagged excess market returns and CIV shocks:
rCAt − r
f
t = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − r
f
t−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt.
Excess returns of the VC indexes and the market are expressed in percentage points. The CIV shocks have
been normalized to have a quarterly standard deviation of one. The row labeled
∑
β reports the sum of
the market factor loadings and the row labeled
∑
δ reports the sum of the CIV shock loadings. The row
labeled F reports the p-value from a two-sided F-test for which the null hypothesis is that the sum of the
coefficients on the CIV shocks are zero. In the first four columns the VC index used is for all VC funds.
In columns (5), (6) and (7) the index is constructed using venture capital funds that CA reports as having
an early, balanced and late investment focus, respectively. Column (8) reports an index constructed from
buyout funds. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CA CA CA CA Early Balanced Late BO
rmt 0.468*** 0.465*** 0.507*** 0.518*** 0.546*** 0.466*** 0.411*** 0.375***
(0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.108) (0.073) (0.071) (0.037)
rmt−1 0.131 0.148 0.193** 0.249** 0.108 0.159** 0.107***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.111) (0.075) (0.074) (0.039)
rmt−2 0.223** 0.240** 0.310*** 0.381*** 0.186** 0.167** 0.080**
(0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.111) (0.075) (0.073) (0.038)
rmt−3 0.214** 0.306*** 0.343*** 0.233*** 0.271*** 0.086**
(0.091) (0.096) (0.109) (0.074) (0.073) (0.038)
rmt−4 0.193** 0.285*** 0.329*** 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.087**
(0.091) (0.096) (0.110) (0.074) (0.073) (0.039)
rmt−5 0.090 0.173* 0.202* 0.153** 0.057 0.062
(0.091) (0.097) (0.110) (0.075) (0.073) (0.039)
εCIVt 0.510 0.830 -0.077 0.128 -0.566*
(0.834) (0.954) (0.646) (0.622) (0.316)
εCIVt−1 0.504 0.784 -0.071 0.425 -0.363
(0.836) (0.956) (0.647) (0.621) (0.318)
εCIVt−2 1.884** 2.518*** 0.654 0.884 -0.251
(0.834) (0.954) (0.646) (0.613) (0.314)
εCIVt−3 1.410* 1.673* 0.754 1.590** 0.162
(0.832) (0.951) (0.644) (0.616) (0.315)
εCIVt−4 2.504*** 2.997*** 1.656** 1.080* 0.265
(0.830) (0.949) (0.642) (0.616) (0.318)
εCIVt−5 0.945 0.975 0.776 0.705 0.284
(0.805) (0.921) (0.623) (0.592) (0.302)
Constant 2.579*** 1.899** 0.644 -0.182 -0.372 -0.027 0.660 1.851***
(0.821) (0.853) (0.914) (0.928) (1.061) (0.718) (0.709) (0.370)∑
β 0.468 0.819 1.391 1.786 2.050 1.350 1.262 0.796∑
δ 7.757 9.776 3.691 4.813 -0.468
F 0.0003 0.0001 0.0242 0.0026 0.5606
R2 0.156 0.204 0.279 0.383 0.378 0.396 0.378 0.631
N 136 134 131 123 123 123 119 107
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Table 2
VC Industry Returns - Sand Hill Econometrics
Statistics are based on monthly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported by Sand
Hill Econometrics, on contemporaneous and lagged excess market and factor returns and contemporaneous
and lagged CIV shocks:
rSHEt = α+ βM (r
m
t − r
f
t ) + βSr
s
t + βHr
h
t +
∑
τ
δτε
CIV
t−τ + εt
Excess returns of the VC index, market and return factors are expressed in percentage points. The risk
factors are the SMB and HML factors of Fama and French (1992). The CIV shocks have been normalized
to have a monthly standard deviation of one. The row labeled F reports the p-value from a two-sided F-test
for which the null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients on the CIV shocks are zero.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mkt-RF 1.564*** 1.566*** 1.577*** 1.579***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
SMB 0.038 0.040 0.047 0.057
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
HML -0.664*** -0.661*** -0.625*** -0.627***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
εCIVt 0.043 0.050
(0.150) (0.154)
εCIVt−1 0.365** 0.378**
(0.147) (0.149)
εCIVt−2 -0.137 -0.143
(0.145) (0.149)
εCIVt−3 0.232 0.239
(0.151) (0.155)
εCIVt−4 0.312**
(0.150)
εCIVt−5 0.185
(0.148)
εCIVt−6 0.157
(0.150)
εCIVt−7 0.120
(0.149)
εCIVt−8 0.122
(0.149)
εCIVt−9 0.016
(0.152)
εCIVt−10 -0.029
(0.148)
εCIVt−11 0.287*
(0.148)
Constant 0.779*** 0.777*** 0.750*** 0.717***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.162) (0.162)∑
δ 0.46 1.69
F 0.074 0.002
r2 0.892 0.892 0.896 0.900
N 274 274 274 274
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3
Option Portfolio Exposure of VC Industry Returns
Statistics are based on quarterly OLS regressions of venture capital industry returns, as reported by Cam-
bridge Associates (CA), on contemporaneous and lagged excess market returns and straddle option portfolio
returns:
rCAt − r
f
t = α+
∑
τ
βτ (r
m
t−τ − r
f
t−τ ) +
∑
τ
δτr
opt
t−τ + εt.
Excess returns of the VC indexes and the market are expressed in percentage points. The straddle option
portfolio is constructed by taking an equally weighted straddle (long call and long put) position in each
of the S&P 500 constituents. The row labeled
∑
β reports the sum of the market factor loadings and the
row labeled
∑
δ reports the loading on the straddle option portfolio return. The row labeled F reports
the p-value from a two-sided F-test for which the null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients on the
straddle option portfolio return are zero. In the first two columns the VC index used is for all VC funds.
In columns (3), (4) and (5) the index is constructed using venture capital funds that CA reports as having
an early, balanced and late investment focus, respectively. Column (6) reports an index constructed from
buyout funds. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA CA Early Balanced Late BO
rmt 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.46***
(0.154) (0.145) (0.163) (0.114) (0.097) (0.042)
rmt−1 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17* 0.15***
(0.152) (0.143) (0.160) (0.112) (0.096) (0.041)
rmt−2 0.26* 0.26* 0.31* 0.19* 0.12 0.10**
(0.152) (0.144) (0.161) (0.113) (0.096) (0.041)
rmt−3 0.26* 0.26* 0.28* 0.23** 0.27*** 0.09**
(0.152) (0.145) (0.162) (0.113) (0.097) (0.041)
rmt−4 0.24 0.25* 0.30* 0.18 0.07 0.04
(0.152) (0.146) (0.163) (0.114) (0.098) (0.042)
rmt−5 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.02
(0.153) (0.146) (0.163) (0.114) (0.098) (0.042)
roptt 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.03
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−1 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.04 -0.02
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−2 0.11 0.15* 0.04 0.06 0.01
(0.071) (0.080) (0.056) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−3 0.19** 0.23*** 0.10* 0.07 -0.00
(0.071) (0.080) (0.056) (0.048) (0.020)
roptt−4 0.13* 0.15* 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.070) (0.079) (0.055) (0.047) (0.020)
roptt−5 0.13* 0.16** 0.08 0.03 -0.03
(0.068) (0.077) (0.054) (0.046) (0.020)
Constant 0.88 2.52* 3.09* 1.06 1.94* 1.63***
(1.544) (1.495) (1.675) (1.172) (1.001) (0.429)∑
β 1.675 1.634 1.822 1.364 1.155 0.867∑
δ 0.697 0.880 0.340 0.316 -0.058
F 0.0003 0.0001 0.0191 0.0111 0.2686
R2 0.313 0.464 0.478 0.442 0.468 0.744
N 70 70 70 70 70 70
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Table 4
Investment Outcomes
Statistics are based on OLS regressions of the Public Market Equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
on CIV levels and shocks:
PMEi = α+ βCIVi + εi.
The variable PME is calculated by discounting the actual cash outflows and cash inflows that the fund
received with the returns on publicly traded equity over the same time period and forming the ratio of the
discounted cash inflows over the discounted outflows. Fund cash flow data are from Burgiss. The sample for
the column labeled “VC” is all VC firms. The sample for columns “Early”, “Balance” and “Late” are VC
funds noted as having early, balanced and late stage focus, respectively. The sample for the column labeled
“Buyout” is all buyout funds. Panel A reports coefficients for regressions of PME on the average level of
CIV over the fund life. The independent variable in Panel B is the average CIV shock over the fund life and
in Panel C is the average CIV shock calculated between months 12 and 48 of the fund life. Standard errors,
in parentheses, are clustered by VC firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Panel A: Regressions on Average CIV
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
average CIV 0.204∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.124∗ 0.037 0.029
(0.057) (0.084) (0.049) (0.132) (0.027)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.013 0.017 0.01 0.001 0.003
Panel B: Regression on average CIV Shock
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
ε̄CIV 0.176∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.051 0.021
(0.045) (0.065) (0.042) (0.122) (0.025)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.001
Panel C: Regression on early CIV Shock
VC Early Balance Late Buyout
ε̄CIV 0.394∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.101 -0.004
(0.061) (0.097) (0.075) (0.110) (0.018)
Observations 914 513 283 118 616
R2 0.044 0.056 0.045 0.007 0.000
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5
PME Exposures for Different β Benchmarks
Statistics are based on OLS regressions of the Public Market Equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and
Schoar (2005) on CIV shocks. The variable PME is calculated by discounting the actual cash
outflows and cash inflows that the fund received with the returns on publicly traded equity over the
same time period and forming the ratio of the discounted cash inflows over the discounted outflows.
Fund cash flow data are from Burgiss. CIV shocks are calculates as the 12-month average of monthly
CIV shocks measured relative to fund founding. For example, if a fund is established in July of
year t, εCIVt,t+1 is the average of the monthly CIV shocks from that July through the following June.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by VC firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PME(1.0) PME(1.5) PME(2.0) PME(2.5) PME(3.0)
εCIVt,t+1 0.223
∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
εCIVt+1,t+2 0.101 0.093 0.090 0.092 0.104
(0.075) (0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068)
εCIVt+2,t+3 0.304
∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.058)
εCIVt+3,t+4 0.345
∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059)
εCIVt+4,t+5 0.159
∗ 0.122 0.092 0.067 0.045
(0.070) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.063)
εCIVt+5,t+6 0.012 -0.044 -0.091 -0.139 -0.193
∗
(0.089) (0.079) (0.074) (0.074) (0.079)
εCIVt+6,t+7 0.026 -0.009 -0.038 -0.067 -0.098
(0.083) (0.074) (0.070) (0.069) (0.075)
Constant 1.208 1.056 0.965 0.926 0.940
(0.074) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061) (0.066)
R2 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.077 0.079
Observations 834 834 834 834 834
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Table 6
Summary Statistics: Individual VC Investments
Statistics are based on the VentureSource dataset. The sample covers venture capital investments
bade between 1990 and 2011. IPO and DEF are indicator variables for whether the company has
a successful IPO or observed default, respectively. CIVt is the CIV at the round close date. ε
CIV
t,t
is the CIV shock over the next year. CIV levels and shocks have been normalized to have mean
zero and standard deviation of one. Indus Q is the average Tobin’s q in publicly traded hi-tech
firms at the round close date. rmt,t+1 is the market return over the following year. Supply is the
dollars invested in VC funds during the quarter as reported by the NVCA. lage is the log age at
first financing. syndsize is the size of the investing syndicate. lraised is the log dollars raised by the
company in its first round. cali and mass are indicator variables indicating whether the company
is based in CA or MA. Multiple is the cash multiple of money earned by a hypothetical dollar
invested in the financing accounting for any future dilution (zero for failed firms). Ann Ret is the
multiple divided by the time between the first rounds and exit, unavailable for failed firms. If the
time between the round and exit is less than one, the cash multiple is used.
variable mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N
IPO 0.155 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 111766
DEF 0.289 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
early 0.292 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
CIVt 0.000 1.000 -1.487 -0.978 0.069 0.853 2.985 111766
εCIVt,t+1 0.000 1.000 -2.136 -0.828 0.038 0.497 3.200 111766
induq 2.072 0.924 0.702 1.465 1.842 2.437 5.242 111766
rmt,t+1 0.010 0.196 -0.568 -0.138 0.063 0.141 0.439 111766
supply 9.895 0.926 7.602 9.354 10.129 10.345 11.527 111766
lage 6.821 1.309 0.000 6.358 7.074 7.617 10.494 111766
syndsize 3.706 2.355 1.000 2.000 3.000 5.000 20.000 111766
lraised 2.001 1.216 -4.605 1.281 2.079 2.826 7.313 107632
cali 0.454 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 111766
mass 0.129 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 111766
Multiple 3.825 7.514 0.000 0.000 1.438 3.870 48.736 20780
Ann Ret 1.258 3.305 -1.000 0.066 0.443 1.308 47.736 14669
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Table 7
Investment Outcomes
This table reports results from OLS regressions looking at the probability of various firm outcomes. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) takes a value of one if the firm fails and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in columns (4)-(6) takes a value of one if the firm has a successful IPO and zero otherwise. Industry
fixed effects control for seven industries. Standard errors, clustered by quarter, in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Prob. of Default Prob. of IPO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CIVt 3.79*** 3.35** 3.50** 1.00*** 1.01*** 1.02***
(1.32) (1.36) (1.39) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Indus. Q 6.33*** 7.06*** 7.45*** -0.37 -0.56** -0.48*
(1.48) (1.51) (1.52) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
εCIVt,t+1 0.20 0.13 -0.04 0.62** 0.68** 0.73**
(1.37) (1.43) (1.44) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
rmt,t+1 0.92 0.06 0.50 0.51 0.86 1.13
(7.20) (7.15) (7.31) (1.48) (1.55) (1.52)
supply 0.13 0.62 0.71 -2.58*** -2.62*** -2.47***
(1.35) (1.40) (1.44) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41)
lage -0.49* -0.52** 0.14*** 0.17***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.05) (0.05)
syndsize 0.07 0.14 0.53*** 0.45***
(0.49) (0.48) (0.17) (0.17)
lraised -3.86*** -3.77*** 0.78*** 0.81***
(0.55) (0.54) (0.16) (0.15)
cali -2.92*** -2.04** 0.28 0.52**
(0.99) (0.97) (0.23) (0.24)
mass -6.72*** -5.79*** 0.26 0.32
(1.63) (1.65) (0.36) (0.36)
Industry F.E. N N Y N N Y
r2 0.030 0.042 0.050 0.018 0.022 0.027
N 11182 10370 10370 11182 10370 10370
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Table 8
Frequency of Reinvestment
Statistics are based the VentureSource sample of venture capital investments. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for whether the portfolio company has another investment from the same venture
capital firm. Columns (1)-(3) use the full sample of investments. Columns (4)-(6) use the subsample of
early investments. Columns (7)-(9) use the subsample of late investments. Early investments are those that
VentureSource designates as seed, angel or first round investments made by a venture capital firm. Standard
errors, clustered by quarter, in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All Rounds Early Rounds Late Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CIVt -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Indus. Q -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
εCIVt,t+1 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
rmt,t+1 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.10*** 0.06 0.07*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
supply -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lage -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
syndsize -0.01*** -0.02*** 0.01* 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lraised 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
cali 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
mass 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry F.E. N N Y N N Y N N Y
r2 0.005 0.034 0.042 0.017 0.036 0.053 0.005 0.025 0.032
N 111768 107634 107634 32638 30928 30928 79130 76706 76706
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Table 9
Time to Next Investment
Statistics are based on OLS regressions using the VentureSource sample of venture capital investments. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of days from investment to the next investment
by the same venture capital firm if such an investment exists. Columns (1)-(3) use the full sample of
investments. Columns (4)-(6) use the subsample of early investments. Columns (7)-(9) use the subsample
of late investments. Early investments are those that VentureSource designates as seed, angel or first round
investments made by a venture capital firm. Standard errors, clustered by quarter, in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All Rounds Early Rounds Late Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Indus. Q -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CIVt -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
εCIVt,t+1 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
rmt,t+1 -0.70*** -0.62*** -0.60*** -0.78*** -0.72*** -0.66*** -0.65*** -0.58*** -0.57***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
supply -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.04** -0.02 -0.02 -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lage -0.01 -0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
syndsize -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
lraised 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cali -0.03** -0.03** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
mass 0.00 -0.00 -0.04* -0.05*** 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Industry F.E. N N Y N N Y N N Y
r2 0.028 0.104 0.114 0.063 0.104 0.134 0.018 0.128 0.134
N 62411 60724 60724 21322 20621 20621 41089 40103 40103
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Table 10
Company Return Dynamics: Cash Multiples
Statistics are based on regressions of the form:
Mi,t = γ0 + γ1CIVt + γ2ε
CIV
t,t+1 + γ3Qt + γ4r
m
t,t+1 + δXi,t + ηi,t
where Mi,t is the gross cash multiple earned on the investment, CIVt and Qt are measured at the date of
first financing, εCIVt,t+1 is the sum of monthly CIV shocks over the year following the first financing and r
m
t,t+1
is the market return over this same period. The multiple is assumed to be zero if the firm is identified as
having defaulted. The variable X is a potential vector of company characteristics and fixed effects. Columns
(1)-(3) use the full sample of investments. Columns (4)-(6) use the subsample of early investments. Columns
(7)-(9) use the subsample of late investments. Early investments are those that VentureSource designates as
seed, angel or first round investments made by a venture capital firm. Standard errors, clustered by quarter,
in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All Rounds Early Rounds Late Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CIVt 0.08 -0.00 -0.06 -0.21 -0.11 -0.22 0.13 0.03 -0.00
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
εCIVt,t+1 0.75
∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.76∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Indus. Q -0.29∗ -0.34∗ -0.39∗∗ -0.16 -0.07 -0.15 -0.39∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
rmt,t+1 6.26
∗∗∗ 5.16∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ 9.70∗∗∗ 8.04∗∗∗ 7.64∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 3.90∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.74) (0.75) (1.40) (1.59) (1.58) (0.61) (0.87) (0.89)
supply -0.10 -0.10 -0.33 -0.33 0.06 0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11)
lage -0.54∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
lraised -0.25∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.49∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10)
cali 0.55∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.15 0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.33) (0.32) (0.16) (0.17)
mass 0.18 0.12 1.04∗ 0.97 -0.20 -0.23
(0.19) (0.20) (0.51) (0.50) (0.19) (0.20)
Industry F.E. N N Y N N Y N N Y
r2 0.045 0.065 0.070 0.059 0.076 0.084 0.040 0.051 0.057
N 20780 20780 20780 6416 6416 6416 14364 14364 14364
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